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NEW YORK
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND
SOCIAL WORKERS:
CONFIDENTIALITY
AND PROFESSIONAL
MALPRACTICE
DIANNE S. LANDI*
In New York, confidential relations and communications between a
psychologist registered under article 153 of the New York State Educa-
tion Law and his or her client are privileged.' Moreover, a person duly
registered as a certified social worker under article 154 of the New York
State Education Law is not permitted to divulge communications with a
client made in the course of their professional relationship.2 This same
privilege applies to a clerk, stenographer, or other employee working for a
social worker in connection with such communications.3
The statute pertaining to registered social workers, unlike the statute
pertaining to registered psychologists, contains four exceptions to the
privilege.' If one of these exceptions is present in a given case, the com-
munication is not privileged. These exceptions are: communications au-
thorized for revelation by the client; communications revealing the con-
templation of a crime or harmful act; communications by a child under
the age of sixteen when such information indicates the child has been the
victim of a crime; and communications in which the client waives the
privilege by bringing charges against the social worker that involve confi-
* B.A. 1980, St. John's University; J.D. 1983, St. John's University School of Law. Dianne
S. Landi is an associate with the New York City law firm of Cusack & Stiles. She practices
in the not-for-profit corporate and related areas of the law.
See N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
See id. 4508.
See id.
See id. 4508(a)(1)-(4).
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dential communications between that client and the social worker."
To qualify as confidential, a communication must be made in reli-
ance on both its confidentiality, and the relationship between the client
and the registered psychologist or social worker." If the communication is
made in the presence of a third party, it will not be considered a privi-
leged communication. In addition, certain basic information is not con-
sidered privileged, including names of patients, and facts that are plainly
observable by a layperson s
In order to invoke the privilege, the communication must be made or
received by a client. A client is a person who has sought the help of a
professional and has been accepted for care by that professional., The
importance of this relationship was illustrated in a wrongful death action
in which the widow of a deceased psychiatric patient brought suit against
a hospital." The conversation between the patient's social worker and the
patient's widow was not excluded at trial as a privileged communication
because the widow was not the client of the social worker." In another
case, a defendant was picked up in Utah on an assault charge and sent to
6 See id.
O See id. 4507, 4508(a). The necessity that the information be disclosed in the course of
"professional employment" is specifically stated with regard to social workers. See id. 4508;
see also People v. McHugh, 124 Misc. 2d 823, 829, 478 N.Y.S.2d 754, 758 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1984) (defendant had burden of proving that social worker was acting in profes-
sional capacity). In regard to registered psychologists, however, it is incorporated by refer-
ence to the attorney-client privilege. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4507 (McKinney Supp.
1988); see also id. 4503(a) ("professional employment" required for attorney-client privi-
lege).
See People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 343, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 1208, 456 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697,
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1982). There is no direct statutory language indicating that the
privilege is waived by the presence of third parties with regard to social workers and psy-
chologists. However, it would seem a logical application of the rule developed for privileges
in general, and applied in Harris between a client and attorney. See id. See generally E.
CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91, at 215-16 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing effect of third
parties on attorney-client privilege).
' See, e.g., Doe v. Hynes, 104 Misc. 2d 398, 403-04, 428 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1980). In Doe, medicaid billings revealing dates of clients' treatment and identity of
some clients were deemed not privileged and were released in furtherance of public policy
against medicaid fraud. See id.; cf. In re Shangel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (attorney's
client's name and fee information not privileged absent special circumstances); People v.
Hedges, 98 App. Div. 2d 950, 950, 470 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (4th Dep't 1983) (exception for medi-
cal evidence plainly observable by layman).
I See, e.g., Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 68-69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511,
514 (1980) (client must contact attorney for professional advice to give rise to attorney-
client privilege).
10 See Lichenstein v. Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center, 56 App. Div. 2d 281, 282-83, 392
N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (1st Dep't 1977).
" See id. at 285, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The Lichenstein court also noted that any privilege
which might have existed was potentially waived by bringing the instant action. See id.
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a state hospital for evaluation. 2 While in the hospital, he had several
conversations with an unregistered social worker. s Despite the social
worker's admonitions to the effect that the conversations were not privi-
leged, the defendant freely admitted that he had committed a murder.1 4
The conversations were not privileged both because the defendant was
not a client of the social worker and the social worker was not registered
under article 154 of the New York State Education Law."
Under article 153 of the Education Law, only a licensed practitioner
shall be authorized to use the term "psychologist," "psychology," or "psy-
chological" in connection with his or her practice." Under article 154 of
the Education Law, the certified practice of social work
is defined as engaging.., in social casework, social group work, community
organization, administration of a social work program, social work educa-
tion, social work research, or any combination of these in accordance with
social work principles and methods.... [flor the purpose of helping individ-
uals, families, groups and communities to prevent or to resolve problems
caused by social or emotional stress."
For the Family Consultation Service, a Catholic counseling service
under the New York Archdiocese, whose staff includes many who are not
registered psychologists or social workers, the question of whether com-
munications made between a client and an unregistered counselor is an
important one. As a general rule, only communications between the client
and a registered psychologist or social worker are protected by the privi-
lege."8 Staff members having access to privileged communications in con-
nection with their duties would be similarly restricted by the cloak of
confidentiality.19 Communications between a client and an unregistered
counsellor are not privileged. 0 However, there have been instances where
counsellors and other staff members who were not registered psycholo-
gists or social workers were deemed to fall within the statutory privilege.
In one of those cases, a wife sought a divorce and custody of her three
12 See People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 19, 20-21, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600-01 (Monroe County
Ct. 1979).
See id. at 21-22, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
1 See id. at 22, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
'6 See id. at 23-24, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03.
1 See N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 7601 (McKinney 1985).
' Id. § 7701.
See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (discussion of privilege between psychologist
or social worker and respective clients).
1" See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (creating privilege restriction for
psychologist's staff through incorporation of attorney-client privilege as codified in 4503(a));
id. 4508 (specific privilege restriction for staff of social worker).
"0 See People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 19, 23-24, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602-03 (Monroe County
Ct. 1979).
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children.2 1 Her husband subpoenaed records of the Jewish Family Ser-
vice.2 2 A number of years prior to commencing the divorce proceedings,
the parties had sought the help of the Jewish Family Service.2" Both the
husband and wife were interviewed by staff personnel including, but not
limited to, registered social workers and a psychiatrist.2 The court re-
fused to enforce the subpoena, holding that the totality of the agency's
function fell within the protection of the privilege.2 Perhaps counseling
services provided by the Family Consultation Service might be deemed
similarly privileged.
The privilege of confidentiality belongs to the client alone and cannot
be waived by the social worker or psychologist without the express con-
sent of the client.2 Express consent, however, can be a tricky concept, as
the following two examples illustrate. In one case, a defendant was on
trial for manslaughter. He took the stand and testified that stab wounds
on his body had been inflicted by another.2s The court held that the de-
fendant had not waived his privilege by testifying as to the cause of his
wounds and, therefore, the hospital psychologist who had interviewed
him could not testify as to the patient's earlier testimony that the wounds
were self-inflicted. 0 In another criminal case, a defendant affirmatively
put his mental condition in issue by raising the defense of insanity. The
court held that the defendant had waived his privilege.20
The law does permit a client to authorize a psychologist or social
worker to disclose privileged communications for the purpose of obtaining
insurance benefits."' The client does not waive the privilege by giving this
authorization.2
See Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 276-77, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1975).
22 Id. at 277, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
23 Id.
24 Id.
5 Id. at 277-78, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 519-20.
26 See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (affording psychologist's client
same protection as attorney's); id. 4508(a)(1) (client may authorize social worker to release
otherwise privileged information); cf. id. 4503(a) (attorney-client information privileged un-
less waived by client). See generally Community Servs. Soc'y v. Welfare Ins. Gen., 91 Misc.
2d 383, 385-89, 398 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95-96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (discussing client-social
worker privilege as compared to other established privileges), aff'd, 65 App. Div. 2d 734, 411
N.Y.S.2d 188 (1st Dep't 1978).
'7 See People v. Wilkins, 65 N.Y.2d 172, 174, 480 N.E.2d 373, 374, 490 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760
(1985).
" See id. at 175, 480 N.E.2d at 375, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
"' See id. at 179-80, 480 N.E.2d at 377-78, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 763-64.
"0 See Florida v. Axelson, 80 Misc. 2d 419, 420, 363 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201-02 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974).
"R See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 4508(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
31 See id.
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The privilege of confidentiality is not absolute, regardless of whether
the professional involved is an attorney, a physician, a psychologist, or a
social worker." The privilege may be superseded by competing interests,
whether imposed by statute or by a court. Some competing interests may
be deemed more important than the policy embodied in the privilege of
fostering trust and confidence between the client and the professional."
Detection and prevention of child abuse is one area where legislation
has abrogated the psychologist-client and social worker-client privileges.35
Section 1046 of New York's Family Court Act provides that neither the
psychologist-client privilege nor the social worker-client privilege shall be
a ground for excluding evidence that would otherwise be admissible in an
action concerning child abuse or neglect. 6 Privilege may also be abro-
gated in the area of controlled substances. Article 33 of the New York
State Public Health Law eliminates any privilege for communications
concerning the illegal sale and acquisition of drugs as well as imposing
specific reporting requirements upon licensed dispensaries of these
substances.37
Confidentiality has also been limited in the area of clinical records
for patients at a facility." A facility is defined as any place in which ser-
vices are provided to the mentally disabled including a psychiatric center,
developmental center, institute, clinic, ward, or building."' A place that
renders nonresidential services for the mentally disabled is not included
in this definition. Therefore, this exception to confidentiality would not
apply to the Family Consultation Service.40
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is a topic in the
forefront of current legislative activity. More than 450 bills were intro-
duced in state legislatures on the subject of AIDS in 1987 alone. AIDS
legislation in the various states has addressed the confidentiality of
records concerning antibody testing, blood processing, storage and distri-
bution, employment, housing, informed consent, insurance, marriage,
prison population, and reporting requirements. New York legislation pro-
hibits the release of information regarding AIDS victims contained in
33 See, e.g., In re Koretta, 118 Misc. 2d 660, 661, 461 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1983) (social worker-client privilege not absolute).
See, e.g., Perry v. Fiumano, 61 App. Div. 2d 512, 518-19, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (4th Dep't
1978) (paramount interest of protecting infant's safety); Doe v. Hynes, 104 Misc. 2d 398,
403, 428 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980) (investigating medicaid fraud
paramount to psychologist-client privilege).
See Perry, 61 App. Div. 2d at 518-19, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
37 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 3350 (McKinney 1985).
s See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1989).
" See id. § 19.11 (McKinney 1988).
,0 See id. § 31.13.
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confidential research records,41 although medically confirmed cases of
AIDS constitute a condition to be reported to the New York State Com-
missioner of Health.'" Originally, these laws were directed solely to the
medical community, but legislation has recently been passed to create
confidentiality when any persons "providing any health or social service"
are informed by a client that he or she is suffering from AIDS.43
As already stated, courts are frequently asked to invade the privilege
of confidentiality. In determining the appropriateness of invading a privi-
lege, courts have traditionally balanced the importance of the privileged
relationship against the importance of the proper disposition of the litiga-
tion involved.' 4 Courts seem most willing to invade the privilege when
confronted with a custody dispute45 or a paternity proceeding, 6 as both
deal with the future well-being of a child.
The protection afforded to a communication in which a party con-
fesses to a crime, or reveals essential elements of a crime, remains uncer-
tain. Under current privilege statutes, as pertaining to social workers, the
only express exception to privilege exists when a client reveals the con-
templation of a crime or harmful act.47 However, in one case, the repre-
sentations made by the defendant to a social worker revealing the com-
mission of welfare fraud were held to be admissible in grand jury
proceedings.'8 Moreover, in a case involving a juvenile who tried to sup-
press her inculpating communications with a social worker,'4 9 the motion
was denied and the social worker was required to testify." The juvenile, a
fifteen-year-old, had been charged with arson at Euphrasian Residence.
The court, applying the aforementioned balancing test, determined that
the importance of the arson determination overcame the juvenile's claim
of privilege."
Communications revealing a client's suicidal intent present special
4 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2776(2) (McKinney 1985) (providing for confidentiality of
personal data of AIDS victims); see also id. § 206(1)(j) (McKinney 1971) (confidentiality
provisions incorporated by § 2776). See generally id. §§ 2775-2779 (McKinney 1985) (pow-
ers, duties, and goals of New York's Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Institute).
42 See N.Y. Sanitary Code, [1988] 10 N.YC.R.R. § 24-1.1.
41 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (effective Feb. 1, 1989).
4 See generally WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961) (discussing bal-
ance of privilege and policy considerations).
15 See, e.g., Perry v. Fiumano, 61 App. Div. 2d 512, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382 (4th Dep't 1978).
4" See Humphrey v. Nordan, 79 Misc. 2d 192, 359 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Family Ct. Queens County
1974).
' See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
See People v. O'Gorman, 91 Misc. 2d 539, 542-43, 398 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1977).
49 See In re Koretta, 118 Misc. 2d 660, 461 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
50 See id. at 661-64, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08.
51 See id.
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problems to a psychologist or social worker. Since a communication made
to a social worker revealing the contemplation of a crime or harmful act is
not privileged, a client's threat of suicide would fall within this excep-
tion.2 However, by revealing such communications the social worker may
be violating an express or implied covenant to the client that communica-
tions would be confidential. The aforementioned exception does not apply
to psychologists. The psychologist may also have the same express or im-
plied covenant of confidentiality.53 In one case, a patient brought an ac-
tion against his psychiatrist for damages when the psychiatrist disclosed
confidential information to the patient's wife." The court found a breach
of confidentiality by the psychiatrist springing from the implied covenant
of confidence for all disclosures made by the patient concerning that pa-
tient's physical or mental condition. 5 The court found no justification for
the disclosure, but kept the possibility open that certain disclosures of
information to a spouse might be justified under circumstances of physi-
cal danger to the patient, spouse, or third party."8
In all cases, an attorney should be consulted before taking any ac-
tion. The ramifications of such action may involve not only the privilege,
but also a lawsuit against the psychologist or social worker based on alle-
gations of professional malpractice, breach of an express or implied cove-
nant of confidentiality, fraud, or defamation.
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
Professional malpractice occurs when a professional acts negligently,
i.e., without reasonable care, and breaches a duty owed to a client or third
party.5 7 What is reasonable under the circumstances depends upon the
standards which are acceptable in the particular profession.5 8
The scope of the duty that a professional owes to a mentally dis-
turbed client raises important questions. The prevalent duty owed to a
client is that of maintaining the confidentiality of the communications
between the client and the professional. 9 As discussed, there is a statu-
62 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
See id. 4507.
See MacDonald v Clinger, 84 App. Div. 2d 482, 482-83, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (4th Dep't
1982).
5 See id. at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
" See id. at 488, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
57 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984).
68 See id.; see also Goodman v. Emergency Hosp., 96 Misc. 2d 1116, 1118, 410 N.Y.S.2d 511,
512 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978) (standard of care for medical profession is standard of such
care in that medical community).
66 See Anker v. Brodnitz, 98 Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1979).
The Anker court noted the high regard New York places on the physician-patient privilege
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tory privilege belonging to a client dealing with a registered psychologist
or social worker. It is the duty of the social worker or psychologist to
maintain confidentiality, and this duty devolves to other staff personnel
who may come across the confidential communications in the perform-
ance of their duties. In certain instances, this duty may extend to third
parties who may come across confidential information. In one case, the
former patient of a psychiatrist brought an action against the psychiatrist
and the psychiatrist's husband for invasion of privacy. 60 The defendants
had published a book eight years after the plaintiffs treatment. The book
reported the plaintiffs thoughts, feelings, fantasies, and background his-
tory verbatim.6" However, the plaintiff's identity was not revealed.6" The
court found a breach of contract as well as an invasion of privacy arising
from both the statutory physician-patient privilege and an implied cove-
nant of confidentiality.6 " The plaintiff received compensatory damages of
$20,000 based on her sufferings, including insomnia, nightmares, and re-
clusive behavior. 6' The defendants were also permanently enjoined from
violating the plaintiff's rights by any further circulation of the book."
As mentioned, the statutory privilege is not all-inclusive. For exam-
ple, the communications between an unregistered counselor or social
worker and his or her respective clients are not covered. The extent of the
privilege attached to such communications is uncertain. Nevertheless, it
is fair to state that the client, advised by a Family Consultation Service
counselor, generally expects that he or she may rely upon the confidenti-
ality of this relationship. This reliance may give rise to a duty on the part
of the counselor to keep that communication confidential.
In certain cases, two opposing duties may conflict, with one duty
militating in favor of confidentiality and the other against. This occurs in
''negligent release" and "duty to warn" cases.
A. Negligent Release
Negligent release occurs in the context of a hospital, or other inpa-
tient facility, which breaches its duty to the public by prematurely releas-
ing a patient with dangerous propensities." Since the Family Consulta-
and the privilege's goals of encouraging free communication and preventing patient humilia-
tion. See id. at 152-53, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 584-86; see also S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES § 7.02 (1983) (discussing importance of nondisclosure by psychotherapists).
60 Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
" Id. at 204, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 670-71.
0" Id. at 205, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
" Id. at 210-15, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 674-78.
" Id. at 217-18, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
65 Id. at 218, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80.
" See, e.g., Austin W. Jones Co. v. State, 122 Me. 214, 223-24, 119 A. 577, 581-82 (1923).
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tion Service does not provide any residential services, premature release
cases are unlikely to affect it.
B. Duty to Warn Third Parties
The theory of duty to warn was introduced in California by Tarasoff
v. Regents of the University of California.6 7 In Tarasoff, plaintiffs were
the parents of a young woman murdered by Prosenjit Poddar. Poddar
had received counseling at the University of California at Berkeley, and
had informed his psychiatrist that he planned to kill a certain young wo-
man. 8 Although he did not specifically name her, other revelations iden-
tified Poddar's intended victim.69 The psychiatrist notified campus police,
who briefly detained Poddar, but no other action was taken.70 Shortly
thereafter, Poddar murdered the young woman. 7' The court recognized a
duty on the part of psychiatrists to protect third parties from patients
whom they consider dangerous, even if violative of the ethic of confidenti-
ality."1 Therefore, a psychiatrist could be civilly liable for the death by
virtue of his failure to warn the young woman of the danger that Poddar
presented.73
A subsequent California case limited this duty.7 4 In that case, a juve-
nile offender was released from a county institution on temporary leave.
The juvenile had a history of violent and sexually abusive behavior to-
ward young children and had indicated to authorities at the institution
that, if released, he would kill a child in his mother's neighborhood." He
did not specifically identify the child to the authorities at the time he
made his revelation, but upon release, he murdered a child.76 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court dismissed the duty to warn suit which had been
brought by the murdered child's parent.77 The court held that in duty to
warn cases, the victim must be identifiable. 78
Beyond this identity requirement, the client must communicate his
or her intent to commit a violent act to a counselor for the institution to
- 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
I d. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
11 Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
70 Id.
1' Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
Id. at 440-41, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
Id. at 446-47, 551 P.2d at 351, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70
(1980).
" Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
" Id. at 749-58, 614 P.2d at 732-38, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-80.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 752-53, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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be held liable.7" For example, in one case, remarkable, perhaps, for its
demonstration of chutzpah, a dentist named Shaw was under the care of
a husband-wife psychiatrist team who had simultaneously been treating
Shaw, Shaw's mistress, and the mistress' husband.80 The husband came
home one night to discover his wife and Shaw in bed together. The hus-
band fired five bullets into Shaw,81 but Shaw lived and brought a civil
action against the husband and the psychiatric team. Shaw's theory was
that the psychiatrists should have warned him of the husband's unstable
and violent condition, which was foreseeable and an immediate danger.s2
Shaw's mistress, however, had told Shaw on the day of the incident that
her husband was acting bizarrely and was carrying a gun." The lower
court dismissed the case against the psychiatric team on the grounds that
Shaw had assumed the risk by having the affair. The appeals court af-
firmed on different grounds, namely, that the husband had never commu-
nicated to the therapists that he had an intention to kill or injure Shaw."'
Tarasoff has been followed in many states, 5 sometimes with modifi-
cation," and has been rejected in many states.87 New York, while not spe-
cifically adopting Tarasoff, has held in one case that the State, which op-
erated an outpatient facility, was liable to a third party for injuries she
suffered when assaulted at knifepoint by an outpatient.8 8 The court in
this case found that the psychiatrist who was treating the outpatient did
not carefully examine the patient, the medical record, or vital information
made available by concerned third parties about the recent behavior of
the patient.8 The court characterized the psychiatrist as taking an "al-
most casual consideration" of the problems of a deeply troubled patient.8 0
It was stated by the court that a member of the general public, such as
the injured plaintiff, should not be required to accept such a risk of
79 See Note, Thompson v. County of Alameda: Tort Plaintiff's Paradise Lost?, 76 Nw. U.L.
REv. 331, 337-39 (1981) (discussing various ramifications of identity requirement).
80 Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980).
s' Id. at 719-20, 415 A.2d at 627.
Id. at 721, 415 A.2d at 628.
Id., 415 A.2d at 627.
Id. at 725, 415 A.2d at 630.
85 See, e.g., Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 68, 499 A.2d 422, 427
(1985) (adopting identity requirement); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489, 403
A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979) (same).
" See, e.g., Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983) (adding duty
for physicians to protect anyone potentially injured by mental patient).
s1 See, e.g., Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or. 706, 717, 717 P.2d 140, 147 (1986) (rejecting Tarasoff
and utilizing statutory negligence criteria in action against mental health provider).
88 See Clark v. State, 99 App. Div. 2d 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1984).
s1 Id. at 617, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73.
9o Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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harm."'
The duty to warn third parties has had some troubling consequences.
One consequence is a reluctance of professionals to cooperate in criminal
proceedings against a client who has been accused of assault or murder,
for fear of furnishing information which could be used against the profes-
sional in a civil suit.92 For example, A is charged with the murder of B.
A's defense is insanity and he waives his privilege, seeking to have his
psychiatrist testify that he is insane. Assuming A had previously revealed
to his psychiatrist that he had an intense desire to kill B because he could
not tolerate B's laugh, the psychiatrist might conclude that A is insane. If
the psychiatrist gives his opinion on the stand that A is insane, he will
have to testify to A's revelation regarding B. If the psychiatrist so testi-
fies, however, he risks liability for breaching his own duty to warn B of
this danger.93
Another troublesome consequence of the duty to warn is that profes-
sionals may become more cautious about what they put in treatment
records which may be subpoenaed at a later date.9 If observations and
revelations are kept off the record, the professional's capacity to effec-
tively treat his or her client could be affected. In any event, the motiva-
tion exists to resolve uncertainties by keeping material off the record to
protect oneself from expensive, time-consuming, and reputation-damag-
ing civil lawsuits. 95
Id., 472 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
*s See Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implication of Tarasoff for
Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EmORY L.J. 263, 322-24 (1982).
11 Id. at 317-19; see McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
94 See Merton, supra note 92, at 324.
9' See id.
